APPENDIX THREE
FURTHER NAZI STRATEGIES FOR ENRICHMENT OF GERMAN COLLECTIONS
Including the Kümmel Report: An Inventory of German Cultural Property in Foreign Hands Since the Year 1500
Private Sales Under Duress
The acquisition of works of art for Germany, at the expense of the conquered countries, was also accomplished by what would appear more legal methods. Direct purchases from private collectors and dealers, particularly the less reputable ones, resulted in the shipment to Germany of large quantities of all kinds of objects that found their way into the collections of the Party leaders, important German museums, and German amateurs. The unfolding of the details of these transactions, paid for in moneys acquired under conditions favorable to the invader, will continue for years.
Tracing Objects by Means of Shipping Records
Of particular interest were the so-called Schenker Papers, analyzed by the British Component of the Allied Control Commission for Germany. I had with me when I went into Germany this useful report derived from papers found in the Paris office of the firm of Schenker, “Transport International.” It listed in detail works of art purchased in France during the Occupation and shipped to Germany for the enrichment of German public collections, private collectors, and German dealers. This information led to the discovery of other shipments when we combed the records of acquisitions in Germany.
A special Art Looting Investigation Unit of the Office of Strategic Services, initiated late in 1944, concentrated on such information relating to looting, confiscation, and transfer by the enemy of art properties in Europe and wherever else the Nazis had dealings.
Discovery of the Kümmel Report in Berchtesgaden
We were particularly dependent upon existing documents to determine accurately the Nazi point of view and the scope of their intentions. At Berchtesgaden, CIC (Counter-Intelligence Corps) agent Albrecht gave me a 338-page book signed “Kümmel” in ink and dated Berlin, January 1941. This copy, marked No. 1, was found near Hitler’s home, and was no doubt proudly sent to Hitler by Kümmel, director general of the State Museums in Berlin.[1]
Kümmel Proposes Repatriations to Germany Reaching Back to 1500
Kümmel’s book, Geraubte Kulturguter (Stolen Cultural Goods) is an extraordinary compendium of information about works of art and culturally important objects allegedly removed from Germany since the year 1500. The book is based on copious preliminary data gathered by Nazi agents and research workers at home and abroad. The impact of Geraubte Kulturguter would have been more far-reaching than its mere implications had the Axis powers won the war.
Kümmel’s Clandestine Methods
This gathering of information by Kümmel’s agents was to be carried out in accordance with orders that the foreign authorities should know nothing about it. Kümmel writes that “it seems impossible that this seemingly harmless research done in the libraries in Paris could have been noticed. On the other hand, there were certain intrusions by unauthorized agencies into the French administration that must have aroused suspicion.”
Kümmel Names “the Main Culprit, France,” but also Includes Some Americans
There is no ambiguity in such a statement as the following from the Kümmel report: “The chief works of art in the French museums could be recognized as stolen or used for restitution in place of others not to be located; however, since they are in the unoccupied area the danger exists that they might be removed or even destroyed by fanatics, as soon as Germany’s intention to claim back their stolen works of art is known.” Kümmel suggests what “conclusions may be drawn in the case of the main culprit, France, and the other countries which fought against Germany and are now or will be under power.” His various suggestions, divided into possible claims, are summarized in this all-embracing thought: “It is questionable whether the entire French possessions would be enough to meet these claims. In view of the justification of these claims, even the most extreme ones, the French could offer no objections.
The far-reaching details of Kümmel’s report will be of interest to historians and peacemakers of the future who will find exhaustive documentation ranging from isolated entries of paintings in American collections to 4,238 silver medals from Kassel to 21,700 etchings and drawings from Cologne, which Kümmel wanted returned from the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris.
Reasons for Germany’s Failure to Protect Its Own Patrimony at Home
If only the Germans had expended some of their energies on safeguarding their art treasures at home rather than planning for enriching their collections from countries occupied by them, the world today would not be bemoaning the loss of great objects belonging to the Berlin museums and others. In particular, I am thinking of masterpieces evacuated from the museums and placed in the air-raid shelters where little or nothing remained after the bombing. There is evidence that they were destroyed by fanatics—SS troops—whose mentality was far different from that of the French accused by Kümmel.
I asked Kurt Thöne, who in 1944 became the adjutant to the late Bernhard Rust, the German minister of education, for an explanation of the early failure to protect cultural objects. He told me that it was not until the spring of 1945, and then only after persistent effort, that he was able to arrange for the shipment of works of art and books from the city. I wanted to know why some of the cases had been so carelessly packed and why more had not been sent away from Berlin earlier. “Germans,” he said, “did not expect bombs to be dropped over Berlin and did not know they could do so much damage. At first, the English had great difficulty in getting over the city because of the defenses.”
He further blamed the failure to place more of Berlin’s vast cultural resources in safekeeping in the countryside on the time element after it was once decided that things were not safe in Berlin and that there was no further possibility of deceiving the German people about their own vulnerability. Other obstacles were the insufficient and inadequate repositories that could have been selected, the lack of packing material, the lack of personnel for the handling of the objects, and the difficulty of securing transportation in Germany when every resource was strained in the war effort. He was finally able, on the approach of the Allied armies, to obtain the cooperation of Albert Speer, war production minister and chief of the Todt organization,[2] and some 60 art students, mostly women, who were organized as packers.[3]
[1] The narrative does not cover Otto Kümmel’s long and contradictory career as an art historian. Before working for Hitler, he had been a well-respected scholar, among the first Western Sinologists to learn Japanese. Notwithstanding Kümmel’s adherence to the Nazi cause, as the Russian army entered Berlin, he supposedly saw to it that soldiers understood where the art was stored in order to ensure its survival. Much of the contents of the stored collections that survived the Soviet capture of Berlin is now in the Hermitage in St. Petersburg and the Pushkin Museum in Moscow. Both of Kümmel’s sons were killed in the war.
[2] The reference is to the engineering organization of the Third Reich, named after Fritz Todt (1891-1942). After the death of its namesake, the organization came under the jurisdiction of Hitler’s architect, Albert Speer (1905-1981), who performed multiple roles during the Third Reich. After trial at Nuremberg, Speer ultimately served out his full 20-year sentence. He is perhaps best known for his detailed account of his life under Hitler, Inside the Third Reich (New York: Macmillan, 1970). LR, AR: according to WorldCat the early editions were Macmillan.
[3] For a recent description of the rush to preserve works of art from the German museums at the fall of Berlin, see the October 6, 2016 lecture by Julien Chapuis on video: www.nga.gov/content/ngaweb/audio-video/video/chapuis-lost-museum.html.